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Dieudonne v. State, 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 1 (January 27, 2011)1
Summary 
 
CRIMINAL LAW AND RPOCEDURE 
 Appeal from a criminal defendant claiming an absolute right to be sentenced by the same 
judge who accepted his plea deal.  Defendant also objects to victim impact statements that were 
given at his sentencing trial, but were not properly sworn. 
Disposition/Outcome 
 The Nevada Supreme Court held that absent an express agreement, there is no absolute right to be 
sentenced by the same judge who accepts the plea.  Additionally, the Court reaffirmed that victim impact 
statements must be sworn, but failure to do so in this case did not rise to the level of plain error. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 The State charged Abell Dieudonne with conspiracy to commit burglary, attempted robbery with 
a deadly weapon, conspiracy to commit murder, and murder with a deadly weapon, in connection with the 
robbery and murder of Giovanna Simmons.  The State alleged that Dieudonne and McNair sought to 
burglarize the Simmons home.  Additionally, the State alleged that McNair was the one who entered the 
Simmons home, robbed her, and killed her.  Meanwhile, Dieudonne served as McNair’s lookout and 
getaway driver. 
 Dieudonne entered his plea before Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez.  Dieudonne agreed to plead guilty 
to conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery with a deadly weapon, and to second-degree murder.  In return, 
the State would not object to the conspiracy charge running concurrently with the other charges.  During 
the plea discussions between Dieudonne and Judge Gonzalez, the Judge used the pronoun “I” several 
times when explaining sentencing discretion; however, she never stated that she would be the one who 
sentenced the defendant. 
 Prior to sentencing, the case was transferred to Judge Douglas Smith.  During the sentencing 
hearing, when Judge Smith asked defense counsel if there was a legal reason not to go forward with 
sentencing, counsel said no.  Defense counsel also did not object to Judge Smith as presiding over the 
sentencing hearing.  During the hearing, the victim’s friends and family gave impact statements.  The 
statements were racially biased, profane, and contained threats – all directed at Dieudonne. 
 Judge Smith sentenced Dieudonne to serve 12 to 72 months on the conspiracy charge, two 
consecutive terms of 60 to 180 months on the robbery with a deadly weapon charge, and 120 months to 
life on the murder charge.  Judge Smith ordered the sentences to run consecutively.  Expecting the 
sentences to run concurrently, defense counsel discussed this with Judge Smith.  Judge Smith, 
acknowledging that Dieudonne likely thought Judge Gonzalez would sentence him, amended the 
judgment, allowing the conspiracy charge to run concurrently with the robbery and murder charges. 
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 On Appeal, Dieudonne contends that he was entitled to be sentenced by the judge who took his 
plea. He also contends that he was entitled to a hearing where those making impact statements were 
properly sworn, and without racial insults and profanity. 
Discussion 
Failure to Object 
 Writing for the Court, Justice Cherry explained that because Dieudonne failed to object to 
his sentencing by Judge Smith or to the victim impact statements, the Court would review his 
arguments on appeal for plain error only.  The Court explained that the error must be clear and 
must affect the defendant’s substantial rights.  Further, Dieudonne must show that the error was 
prejudicial to in order to prove it affected his substantial rights. 
Sentencing Requirements 
 Dieudonne argued that due process entitled him to be sentenced by the same judge that 
took his plea.  He also argued that he entered the plea with an expectation that Judge Gonzalez 
would sentence him.  Dieudonne relied heavily on People v. Arbuckle,2 a California case where 
the California Supreme Court dealt with the same issue.  There, the judge who accepted a 
defendant’s plea was transferred to another department.3  The defendant objected during 
sentencing, requesting the previous judge; the court denied the request.4  On appeal, the court 
agreed with the defendant and held that the sentence imposed by another judge could not stand.5
 The Court then chronicled Arbuckle and its progeny, noting that California courts have 
interpreted Arbuckle in various ways.  Some of the courts have interpreted it to mean there is an 
implied term in plea deals that the same judge will both take the plea and sentence the 
defendant.
 
6  Other California courts have rejected the proposition that the judge who accepts the 
plea must always be the same judge who sentences the defendant.7
 The Court also recounted federal circuit court decisions.  The Eighth Circuit has held that 
there is no federal right to be sentenced by the same judge who took the plea.
   
8  The same is true 
in the Eleventh Circuit9 as well as in the Third Circuit.10
 The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that Arbuckle went too far by recognizing an 
absolute right to be sentenced by the judge who accepted the plea.  The Court was worried about 
acknowledging such an absolute right many reasons.  If it accepted that argument, then 
defendants could profoundly affect proceedings, simply based on an unmentioned expectation.  It 
would also interfere with the district courts’ authority to manage their caseloads.  And allowing 
       
                                                          
2 587 P.2d 220, 224-25 (Cal. 1978). 
3 Id. at 222. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 225. 
6 See, e.g., People v. Letteer, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 723, 732-34 (Ct. App. 2002). 
7 See, e.g., People v. Hsu, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 566, 574 (Ct. App. 2008). 
8 See, e.g., Taylor v. Bowersox, 329 F.3d 963, 969 (8th Cir. 2003). 
9 See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 776 F.2d 955, 959 (11th Cir. 1985). 
10 See, e.g., United States v. Pizzo, 453 F.2d 1063, 1065 (3d Cir. 1972). 
defendants such an absolute right would permit them to obtain more favorable sentences by 
asking to be resentenced by the judge who originally accepted the plea. 
 The Court did acknowledge that a defendant might have a reasonable expectation that the 
judge would be the same for the plea and sentencing.  However, that expectation is not an 
absolute right.  The defendant must make an express agreement as part of the plea that the judge 
will be the same for the plea and sentencing in order to claim such an absolute right. 
 In this case, the Court noted, Dieudonne failed to show any expectation of being 
sentenced by the same judge that accepted the plea.  There is no evidence of an express 
agreement.  Additionally, Dieudonne’s failure to object enforces the conclusion that he did not 
enter the plea in reliance of being sentenced by Judge Gonzalez. 
Victim Impact Statements 
 Next, the Court turned to the issue of the victim impact statements.  The Court 
immediately agreed with Dieudonne that the district court failed to swear in the victim impact 
witnesses.  The Court used that opportunity to reaffirm Buschauer v. State.11
 The Court also determined that the error was a plain error.  However, the Court could not 
conclude that the error affected Dieudonne’s substantial rights.  The Court relied on Judge 
Smith’s statement that the primary reason for his decision was the defendant’s criminal history; 
he made no indication that the decision was based on victim impact statements. 
  There, the Court 
held that witnesses giving oral victim impact statements must be sworn before they can testify.   
 The Court turned to NRS 176.015(3) to analyze Dieudonne’s contention that the victim 
impact witnesses’ profane remarks violated his due process rights.12  The Court concluded that 
the statute allowed for the reasonable expression of views related to the crime.  But looking to 
California for guidance, it determined that the statue did not allow for racially charged comments 
or profanity.13  Further, the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to manage such 
behavior in a courtroom.14
 Additionally, the Court reiterated that because Dieudonne failed to object to the victim 
impact testimony, it would only review the issue for plain error.  The Court agreed that the 
impact statements did contain profane language; however, the language in question did not 
render the proceeding unfair.  Nothing in the record shows that Judge Smith’s decisions were 
affected by the victim impact statements.  Thus, the Court held that the impact statements did not 
affect the defendant’s substantial rights. 
 
Conclusion    
  Absent an express agreement, criminal defendants have no absolute right to be sentenced 
by the same judge who accepted the plea.  Additionally, witnesses must be sworn before offering 
oral victim impact statements. 
                                                          
11 106 Nev. 890, 893, 804 P.2d 1046, 1048 (1990). 
12 NEV. REV. STAT. 176.015(3) (2007). 
13 See, e.g., People v. Polite, 45 Cal. Rptr. 845, 850 (Ct. App. 1965). 
14 NEV. CODE JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 2, R. 2.8 (West 2007). 
